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In the late 1960s and early 19708American students were told that the value of a college
education was declining (see Freeman 1976). Although liberal arts students were particularly
discouraged by reports of recent graduates driving taxicabs, even the demand for engineers and
other technical specialists seemed bleak. Two decades later, the headlines have reversed. Study
after study proclaims that American children are performing more poorly on achievement tests than
the children of most other industrialized nations. Employers complain of a shortage of skilled
workers: young people are said to be ill-prepared for the demands of the workplace and older
workers are said to lack the educational background requisite for retraining (Johnson and Packer
1987). Studies by labor economists have largely confirmed the employers' contentions and foretell
of even greater shortages of skilled labor in the near future (Bishop and Carter 1991).
The new headlines have caused alarm, in part, because they affront our national pride. How
could the United States, so long acknowledged as the educational Mecca of the world, have allowed
its people to become so poorly educated? Even more troubling has been the fear that an
inadequate educational system is somehow responsible for America's declining economic
performance. Beneath such fear lies the perception that the rules of prosperity have changed.
Whereas in the past our well-being flowed from the ability of a well paid, but largely unskilled,
workforce to mass produce goods, future prosperity is said to hinge on the utilization of scientific
and technical knowledge, the management of information, and the provision of services. In short, it
appears that the future may depend more on brains than brawn.
Accordingly, national attention has turned to strategies for improving the education of the
American people. Prominent initiatives include plans for reemphasizing math and science, schemes
for attracting and retaining more talented teachers, funds for both on- and off-the-job training, and
methods for improving the flow of information in the labor market. Although there is little doubt
that the workforce of the future will indeed need to be better educated, it is unlikely that
educational reform will by itself solve America's economic woes.
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Reformers often speak as if tomorrow's firms will be much like today's with the exception
that they will employ fewer and better educated workers and that they will pay more attention to
training (Center for Advanced Human Resource Strategy 1991). If such a vision were accurate, the
sudden crisis in workforce preparation could indeed be localized to the educational system.
However, such an account ignores the most perplexing aspect of the educational crisis: the rapidity
at which the tables seemed to have turned. What could have caused the educational system to
become so poor so quickly and why should older Americans who were presumably schooled before
the much heralded decline of standards also be found wanting? Could the escalating need for
skilled labor be less of a symptom of our schools' failure than a harbinger of a more fundamental,
but unanticipated, change in the division of labor? If the division of labor is shifting and if that
shift demands a better educated workforce, then efforts to "upskill" the workforce may improve not
only America's competitiveness, they may also accelerate a trajectory that could, in the long run,
alter the very fabric of society.
At present the implications of a restructured division of labor for the social organization of
work are not well understood. This paper highlights changes that seem to have contributed to the
so-called crisis of preparedness, speculates on their potential implications for the workplace, and
outlines a program of research on that segment of that labor force most clearly associated with the
change: technical workers.
The Changing Division of Labor
The direction in which the division of labor is headed can be gleaned from Table 1, which
displays, at ten year intervals since 1900, the percentage of the labor force employed in the Census
Bureau's eight broad occupational categories. The table clearly indicates that the occupational
structure of the U. S. has changed dramatically since the turn of the century. Most obvious and
well-known has been the demise of agricultural employment, a trend that actually began during the
19th Century (porat 1976; Bell 1979). In 1900 agriculture was still the most significant source of
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employment: 38% of all Americans wodeed on fanns. By 1988, a mere 3% of the population were
so employed. The shift away from an agriculturally dominated worlcforcewas largely complete by
1960 when, for the first time, no other occupational category employed fewer people.
If the first half of the 20th Century consummated America's decline as an agrarian society,
the second half signaled its demise as a manufacturing society. Direct employment in the
production of goods peaked during the 1940s when 4 out of 10 Americans wodeed either as
craftspersons or as operatives and laborers. By 1988, the percentage had fallen to 36 percent.
Because the crafts retained a relatively stable proportion of the labor force throughout the century,
manufacturing's decline occulTed primarily at the expense of semiskilled and unskilled labor.
Between 1940 and 1988, the percentage of the labor force employed as operatives and laborers fell
by 12%. It would therefore seem that blue-collar work, as it is typically conceived, dominated the
division of labor for a span of 50 brief years: operatives and laborers had become the most
prevalent occupational category by 1930, but had ceased to be so by the mid-1980s.
As is widely known, the demise of agricultural and blue-collar wode was offset by
tremendous growth in the "white-collar" labor force. The percentage of Americans employed in
managerial, sales, clerical, professional, and technical occupations rose from a mere 18% of the
working population in 1900 to 56% in 1988, an increase of 36 percentage points. Although the
rise of white-collar wode is hardly news, several of the dynamics by which the shift occurred are
less well appreciated.
Analysts often suggest that an expansion of clerical and service jobs largely compensated for'
declining agricultural and manufacturing employment. Consequently, one frequently hears that the
American economy is being transformed into a service economy marked by low paying jobs in fast
food franchises and clerical sweatshops (Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Levin and Rumberger 1983;
Rumberger 1986). The data in Table 1 pose difficulties for such claims. Oerical occupations have
indeed grown tremendously since the turn of the century. Clericals now account for 13% more of
the working population than they did in 1900. However, most of this growth occurred during the
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first half of the century when three quarters of the 13% increase occurred. In fact, clerical
employment has declined in prominence since 1970 when it peaked at 18% of the labor force.!
Thus, if clerical occupations helped to absorb the decline in agricultural and manufacturing jobs,
they did so primarily before the 19508.
Even more problematic for the claim that America is becoming a service economy are data
on employment in the service occupations. Although the service sector expanded during the 20th
Century, with the exception of craftworlcers, service occupations grew less extensively than any
other occupational classification. From 1900 to 1988 employment in service worlc increased by
only 4%. Thus, it appears that since 1950 much of the growth in the white-collar labor force has
occurred among managerial, sales, and especially professional and technical occupations.
Professional and technical occupations have accounted for the largest proportion of the non-
clerical shift to a white-collar worlcforce. Since 1900 professional and technical worlc's share of
employment has increased by 12%, a rate of growth exceeded only by the clerical occupations.
However, in sharp contrast to the clerical workforce, three quarters of the increase in the
professional and technical worlcforce occurred after 1950. In fact, since World War II, professional
and technical worlchas grown more rapidly than any other occupational sector. As Figure 1
indicates, the number of professional and technical worlcers increased by 282% over the last four
decades. Only sales occupations grew at even a remotely similar rate. By 1988 professional and
technical worlcers were tied with clericals and with operatives and laborers for the status of most
prominent occupational category: each group accounted for 16% of the worlcing population.
Economic forecasts indicate that professional and technical occupations will continue to grow'
rapidly. Table 2 provides one such estimate based on the Silvestri and Lucasiewicz's (1989)
projected growth rates for each occupational sector assuming that the economy as a whole grows
moderately. Not only are professional and technical occupations projected to be the fastest growing
1 The 2% decline over !he last two decades probably reflects, at least in part. !he computerization of office work.
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segment of the labor force, but by the turn of the century professional and technical woIters should
account for more employment (18%) than any other segment. Over a quarter of all new jobs
created between 1990 and 2000 are anticipated to be professional or technical jobs. If, as some
labor economists argue, the government's estimates are conservative, then professional and technical
occupations may represent as much as 20% of the worlcforce by the year 2000 (Bishop and Carter
1991).
Hence, the story told by data on the occupational division of labor in the United States is
not simply one of movement from a blue-collar to a white-collar society. The data strongly
indicate that America has become embroiled in what might be labeled the "technization" of the
workforce. Over the course of the decade, professional and technical woIters have been catapulted
from the second most peripheral occupational category to what may be the core of the labor force
by the next century. Several interwoven dynamics have spurred the transfonnation.
Engines of Change
The Bureaucratization of Professions
Perllaps the most subtle dynamic has been the trend toward ever larger and more
bureaucratic organizations (Zucker 1983) With the exception of engineers, at the turn of the
century, most professionals worked either as solo practitioners or in small partnerships. Doctors,
lawyers, and accountants served clients from their homes or offices and played an economic role in
their communities similar to that of small businessmen. Over the 20th Century solo practice
dwindled. Between 1931 and 1980 self-employment among physicians fell from 80% to
approximately 50% (Derber and Schwartz 1991). Similarly, less than one-third of all lawyers in the
U. S. now work as private practitioners, whereas in 1950 over 50% were so employed (Spangler
1986). Even in relatively rural areas professional services are today frequently dispensed by law
finns, accounting finns, hospitals and other professional bureaucracies that hire professionals as
salaried employees.
..,-~.,.." ~
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Professional bureaucracies have spawned employment opportunities for professionals in two
ways. Because hospitals, law finns, and accounting finns have access to more resources than do
solo practitioners, they can afford equipment and facilities that enable them to provide services that
clients could not otherwise obtain. The provision of such services increases the population's
demand for the profession's expertise, thereby enabling professional bureaucracies to suppon more
practitioners per capita than would occur under a regime of solo practice. Professional
bureaucracies have also created an organizational context conducive to specialization. Because
professional bureaucracies collocate practitioners, they can employ specialists and still provide
breadth of expertise. On average, specialization requires that more practitioners become involved in
meeting the needs of a client.
Bureaucratization and the trend to larger organizations affected the demand for professionals
in several other ways. Large organizations consume professional services, especially those offered
by lawyers and accountants. As the number of organizations increased, corporate demand
augmented individual demand for professional services thereby enlarging the market for professional
employment In some occupations, such as law and accounting, corporate demand eventually
surpassed individual demand. Moreover, as corporations grew they discovered that it was often
cheaper, if not more effective, to provide for themselves expertise that they fonnerly purchased
from solo practitioners or professional bureaucracies. Accordingly, corporations began to hire their
own professionals which further increased demand. Recent examples of the importation of
professionals into corporate settings include the growth of legal departments in multinational finns
and the creation of corporate medical units charged exclusively with caring for a finn's employees.
Expansion and Application of Scientific Knowledge
A second important reason for the growth of the professional and technical workforce has
been the increasing centrality of science to modem society. Price's (1986) research on the growth
of science indicates that scientific knowledge has expanded exponentially since the 17th century.
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Price estimated that by the 1960s scientific output was doubling every 6 to 10 years, a rate of
growth "much faster than that of all the nonscientific and nontechnical features of our civilization"
(Price 1986: 141). As Price was fond of noting, 90% of all scientists who have ever lived are
alive today.
Science's explosive growth has been sustained, in part, by the realization that scientific and
technical knowledge could generate considerable profits. The commercialization of chemistry and
physics during the last two decades of the 19th and the first half of the 20th Centuries gave rise to
the industries on which the modem economy pivots: aerospace, automobiles, energy,
pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, and electronics. Advances in the life sciences, especially in
immunology, microbiology, biophysics, and biochemistry, largely underwrote the expansion of the
health care industry that began after World War II. More recently, molecular biology and its
associated technologies have opened opportunities for entirely new industries and have
revolutionized others (Barley, Freeman, and Hybels 1992; Teitelman, 1989; Olsen, 1986).
The explosion of scientific knowledge, both basic and applied, brought a burgeoning demand
for scientists, engineers, technicians and health professionals. However, the expansion and
commercializationof science did not simply enlarge existing fields, but it also triggered a
proliferation of new occupations. Two processes have figured prominently in science's contribution
to the growth of the technical labor force: specialization and the "hiving off' of work.2
As the stock of knowledge in a discipline becomes more complex, scientists and other
professionals find it increasingly difficult to remain generalists. Breadth of knowledge is attained at
the expense of depth, and visa versa. While generalists may be quite effective at screening
problems and clients, they are less prepared than specialists to advance a field's knowledge or
provide state-of-the-art services. Since the latter activities are more highly valued, most sciences
and professions have adopted a strategy of specialization, the carving of cognate areas into ever
2 The term, "hiving off: is adopted from Smith (1987). The concept, though not the term, probably entered the
sociological literature with Hughes (1958).
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nalTOwersubfields. Specialization increases the number of employed professionals not only by
opening up new territory, but by requiring collaboration. Under a regime of specialization,
increasingly few individuals can execute alone tasks that require both breadth and depth of
expertise.
Overburdened professionals have also sought to curb their workloads by allocating routine
duties to somewhat less well-trained individuals. Many of the technical and "semi-professional"
occupations that have flourished in the later half of the 20th Century originated in the "hiving off'
of "dirty" work by the established professions. The phenomenon has been most visible in health
care where licensed practical nurses, medical technologists, radiological technologists and an ever
expanding array of technicians have coalesced into occupations around tasks discarded by their more
prestigious brethren (Hughes 1958). However, the dynamic is also prevalent outside health care
where it has given birth to a plethora of technical occupations ranging from the reasonably well-
known (paralegals, electronics technicians, chemistry technicians) to the amazingly obscure (test and
pay technicians, see Kurtz and Walker 1975).
Technological change
Perhaps the most important force for the growth of the professional and technical workforce
has been technological change. Throughout history technologies have spawned new occupations.
The wheelwright, the blacksmith, the machinist, the automobile mechanic, and the airline pilot are
but convenient illustrations. In the past, technologies created occupations across the entire division
of labor. Modem technologies have also sired occupations in all strata, but those with a high
technical content appear to have become more common.
Commentators usually credit this change to the advent of the computer. In 1950 few people
worked with computers and most who did were mathematicians (pettigrew 1973). By the 1970s
computers had given birth to such well-known occupations as programmer, systems analyst,
operations researcher, computer operator, and computer repair technician. These occupations, which
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now employ over 1.36 million workers, continue to be among the fastest growing. By the turn of
the century they are anticipated to provide employment for 1.99 million people.3
However, the explosion of occupations directly related to the computer is only the most
visible sign that technology may now favor the technical and professional workforce. Numerous
technical occupations have been created of the last four decades by technologies other the computer:
for instance air traffic controllers, nuclear technicians, nuclear medical technicians, broadcast
engineers, technical writers, and materials scientists. Moreover, computers have altered the contours
of many more traditional jobs. In the long run, the effects of computerization on existing lines of
work may prove to be the most important force for the technization of the workforce.
To grasp how computers have accelerated the technization of work by altering existing jobs,
one must distinguish between two broad types of technological change. Most technical change is
substitutional: the replacement of an earlier technology by a more efficient or effective successor.
Examples of technical substitutions are legion: pens for pencils, jackhammers for picks, jet planes
for prop planes, and so on. Historically, technological substitutes have made work easier to
perfonn and have generated considerable profits by reducing labor costs and allowing economies of
scale. However, the effects of substitutional change tend to be localized to specific industries
simply because the tasks that the technologies perfonn are, by and large, peripheral to the economy
as a whole.
Infrastructural technological change is quite different and more rare. Infrastructural
technologies are the relatively small set of technologies that fonn the cornerstone of a society's
system of production during an historical era. Until recently, the economies of the advanced
industrial nations have revolved around electrical power, the electric motor, the internal combustion
engine and the telephone (Coombs 1984). Anthropologists and sociologists have repeatedly shown
that technical infrastructures shape not only a society's economy but also its cultural institutions
3 Estimates are based on data from Silvestri and Lukasiewicz's (1989) estimates for a moderate growth scenario.
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(Marx 1970/1859; Spicer 1952; Pelto 1973; Bell 1973; Harris 1979; Pacey 1983). Accordingly,
when societies experience a change in their infrastructure one can expect rather far reaching
reverberations.
American society last encountered a shift in its technical infrastructure during the late 19th
and early 20th Century (Hughes 1983; Hounsell 1984). The shift, sometimes termed the Second
Industrial Revolution, was largely responsible for America's move from an agrarian to a
manufacturing economy and was accompanied by a tremendous upheaval in American culture.
Urbanization, the growth of corporations, the rise of professional management, the demise of
religion and the disintegration of the extended family are among the more prominent trends that can
be traced to the restructuring of the economy by electrical power, the telephone, and the internal
combustion engine.
The danger of infrastructural change is that people tend to treat it as if it were substitutional
change, thereby underestimating the technology's impact. For instance, Pelto's (1973) study of the
transformation of Skolt Lap society in the decade following the Skolt's first encounter with the
snowmobile makes clear that Skolt reindeer herders wrongly viewed the snowmobile as little more
than a faster and more efficient means of herding. Similarly, Americans at the turn of the century
embraced the automobile as a "horseless carriage" little anticipating that the car would transform
their way of life in less than 50 years (Fink 1975).
Recent developments strongly suggest that the industrialized West is again experiencing an
infrastructural shift based on the development and diffusion of computational controls (Beniger
1986). The computer, as it is normally conceived, is only the most visible part of the change.
Our growing knowledge of how to convert electronic and mechanical impulses into digitally
encoded information (and visa versa), and how to transmit such information across vast distances is
gradually enabling industry to replace its electro-mechanicalinfrastructure with a computational
infrastructure. The ramifications of a computational infrastructure for the workforce are potentially
staggering. For instance, it is already possible to run an entire factory from a bank of terminals
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located in an air conditioned control room (Zuboff 1989). Similarly, engineers can now design
parts on a CAD system in one city and have them machined in another without human
intennediaries (Ruszic 1981).
Yet, most finns continue to justify even the most sophisticated computational technology
with the logic of substitution. From this perspective, personal computers appear to be little more
than more efficient typewriters, computer controlled machine tools are a quicker and more reliable
means of machining, and electronic messaging is simply a faster way to deliver the mail. One can
frame computational technologies as a technological substitutes only be ignoring their cybernetic
nature. Like traditional servo-mechanisms,cybernetic technologies execute tasks via "effector
links," but unlike servo-mechanismsthey also acquire infonnation on the state of the task via
"feedback" links (see Figure 2). Because the concept of an effector has long supponed the
economic logic of automation and because the cost/benefit analyses associated with automation are
well understood, finns often emphasize only the effector link when justifying a purchase. However,
as Zuboff (1985) cogently notes, computational technologies do not simply automate, they also
"infonnate" . That is, they allow their operators access to previously unavailable infonnation and
require skills that have not nonnally been expected of a machine's user. Ironically, in the case of
computational control both the automating and the infonnating capacities of the technology have
exacerbated the technization of work.
Although, in theory, automation can reduce costs simply by increasing productivity, finns
often hope that automation will enable a reduction of the worldorce and a shift to less skilled labor. '
However, deskilling does not usually occur simply because a technology can now perfonn a task
previously perfonned by a human. Technologies typically automate the most routine parts of a job
simply because routines are easier for designers to program. To successfully deskill workers, finns
must usually reallocate the more complex aspects of a target occupation's work to another
occupation. Since the occupations that benefit from such reallocations tend to acquire cognitive and
technical responsibilities, deskilling unintentionally expands the number of technical workers. For
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instance, Smith (1987) has argued that the reallocation of cognitive skills previously exercised by
craftsmen and foremen was largely responsible for the birth of such technical occupations as rate-
fixers, estimators, and inspection and planning engineers. Similar arguments have been made for
the rise of NC programmers and schedulers in machine shops (Braverman 1973).
Even when skills are not reallocated, automation may still skew a firm's labor force toward
technical employees if the employment of unskilled and semiskilled labor declines. DiPrete (1988)
and Attewell (1987) have shown that two decades of computerization have altered the worlcforce of
firms in the insurance and banking industries by precisely such a path. Although office automation
enabled firms in these industries to reduce their reliance on lower level clerks, the relative
importance of more highly skilled workers (particularly those who program and maintain computers
and databases) has increased as the number of clerical employees fell.
The capacity of computational technologies to informate work has been even less well
anticipated. Accumulating evidence indicates that computational systems may bring a technical
component to nontechnical and even semiskilled work. For instance, Zuboff (1989) concluded from
her studies of computer integrated paper mills that the technology required blue-collar operators to
analyze data and then make decisions based on their analysis in order to control the production
process effectively. In the past, such skills were reserved for mid-level managers. Similar findings
are common among studies of machinists and operatives in manufacturing plants that have adopted
computerized numerical control and other forms computer automated manufacturing (Majchrzak,
1988). Nor are such dynamics confined to the factory floor. Barley's (1990) research on medical
imaging indicates that radiological technologists must learn to interpret pathological signs in order
to operate cr scanners, ultrasound, or digital subtraction angiography. The need for such skills
threatens radiology's longstanding mandate that technologists be barred from interpretive knowledge.
Finally, Nelsen's (1991) pilot study of secretaries in universities suggests that the spread of personal
computers among faculty members is slowly shifting the secretary's work toward that of a research
assistant.
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The message of such studies is consistent. As the technical infrastructure becomes
increasingly computational, even blue-collar worlcerswill be asked to process abstract, symbolic
information and to engage in procedural and mathematical reasoning in order to accomplish their
work. Computer integrated technologies demand that worlcers understand the larger production
system of which they are a part and make decisions formerly reserved for occupations with higher
status.
In sum, the technization of the labor force appears to be driven by four general dynamics:
(1) an increased demand for members of existing professional and technical occupations, (2) the
proliferation of new occupations with a technical and scientific core, (3) declining employment
among the ranks of the semiskilled and unskilled, and (4) the infusion of analytical and technical
content into jobs that have not traditionally been considered technical in nature. The movement
toward an increasingly technical workforce not only creates a need for a better educated worlcforce,
it also poses a significant challenge for way in which the workforce and the worlcplaceare
currently conceptualized and organized.
The Occupationalization of Organizations
Vertical and Horizontal Divisions of Labor
Broadly speaking, two models exist for dividing labor in a society or organization. In a
vertical division of labor authority and expertise are arranged hierarchically. Those higher in the
hierarchy not only have power over those below, but they are generally assumed to have greater
expertise. In fact, in a vertical division of labor superiors can exercise authority legitimately only
to the degree that their knowledge encompasses, or is perceived to encompass, that of their
subordinates (Weber 1968/1922). Vertical divisions of labor presume that knowledge and skills can
be nested in cumulative fashion. Because vertical divisions of labor encode expertise in rules,
procedures and positions, organizations are usually have been the primary tool for preserving and
enacting expertise (Abbott 1991). In most instances, the knowledge associated with a position of
the hierarchy is relatively specific to the organization in which the hierarchy exists.
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In sharp contrast, authority and expertise are balkanized and allocated to members of distinct
groups in a horizontal division of labor. The logic of a horizontal division of labor rests on the
assumption that knowledge and skills are domain specific and too complex to be nested.
Consequently, individuals rather than positions become the vessels of expertise in a horizontal
division of labor. Knowledge is preserved and transmitted through extended training rather than
through rules and procedures. Coordination occurs not through a chain of command but through
the collaboration of members of different groups working conjointly. Members of each group retain
authority over their own work while interacting with members of other groups to manage the
interface of their respective components of a task. In a horizontal division of labor, skills and
knowledge tend to be transportable across work sites.
Although scholars agree that a horizontal division of labor characterized Western society
until the late 1700s, since the beginning of the 19th Century a vertical division of labor has become
increasingly dominant In fact, sociologists have long argued that vertical models for organizing
labor lay at the core of the cultural transformation known as the Industrial Revolution (Durkheim
1933/1893;Tonnies 1957/1887; Weber 1968/1922). The vertical dimension now so overshadows
our thinking that it suffuses most of the cultural categories by which we make sense of work.
Terms such as "manager", "capitalist", "white-collar" and "mental work" usually invoke images of
the upper echelons of a vertical division of labor. "Worker", "proletariat", "blue-collar" and
"manual work" imply stations in the lower echelons. Even occupational terminology has been
pressed into a vertical mold: professions are said to be "above" the "semi-professions" which, in
turn, are said to be "above" the crafts.
The Anomalous Position of Technical Workers
However, the professional and technical workforce has never neatly fit a vertical scheme for
classifying labor. The fit has been particularly troublesome for technical workers. Technicians
often wear white collars, carry briefcases, conduct relatively sophisticated scientific and
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mathematical analyses, and speak with an educated flair. Yet, technical workers use tools and
instruments, work with their hands, make objects, repair equipment, and perhaps most importantly,
get dirty. Like those in higher echelons, technical workers have considerable autonomy and are
often trusted by their employers. With the exception of professionals, technical workers constitute
the most highly educated occupational category (Carey and Eck 1984). Yet, like those in the lower
echelons, technical workers are often paid poorly (Franke and Sobel 1970), accorded low status, and
may be subject to stringent bureaucratic controls (OIT 1991).
Most commentators have sought to resolve such anomalies either by claiming that
professional and technical workers exist outside the vertical division of labor or by forcing them
into positions within a vertical frame. The first strategy long dominated research on the
professions. Early sociological analyses of the professions almost invariably assumed that solo
practice was not only the prototypical but the proper form of professional employment (Goode
1957; Parsons 1968). In fact, much of this work concentrated on explaining status differences
among occupations and ignored the context of professional work altogether (parsons, 1939; Davis
and Moore, 1949; Merton, 1960). With few exceptions (Marcson 1960; Smigel 1964; Strauss, et al,
1964), even ethnographers of professional practice wrote as if professionals were unfettered by the
constraints of an organizational division of labor.
It was not until the 19608 that sociologists began to examine the employment of
professionals by organizations. But because researchers continued to measure professional work by
the yardstick of independent practice, the bureaucratic employment of professionals was often
treated as an abelTation. Sociologists of the period spent much ink explaining why organizationally-
embedded occupations, such as engineering and nursing were not "real" professions (Becker and
Carper 1956; Kornhauser 1962; Permcci and Gerst! 1969; Ritti 1968; Etzioni 1969). In the
sociological paradigms of the time, the attributes of bureaucratic and professional work were simply
antithetical (Freidson 1971). Theoreticians predicted that this conflict would lead to alienation
among bureaucratically employed professionals. Although researchers repeatedly uncovered little of
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the anticipated discontent (Scott 1965; Miller 1968; Hall 1968; Ritti 1971), recent work on
professionals and organizations has resurrected themes common in the 19608 (Raelin 1985; von
Glinow 1988).
Conflict between professions and organizations attracted renewed attention in the late 1970s
when Marxist scholars began to suggest that many, if not all, professions were well on the road to
"deprofessionalization" (Haug 1973; Toren 1975; Kraft 1978; Greenbaum 1979). Paralleling
Bravennan's (1974) description of the deskilling of craft work, deprofessionalization theorists argued
that organizational employment enabled capitalists to increase their power over professionals by
effectively stripping them of their ability to control their work. Deprofessionalization theory
predicted that the professions' power and autonomy would decline as they became more
organizationally bound. Either professionals would be transfonned into managers or staff or
reduced to another fonn of wage labor.
The forcing of technical and professional work into a vertical framework has been even
more prevalent in the literature on technicians. Marxist scholars of the technical workforce have
concentrated on detennining to which class technical workers rightfully belong. One camp
conceives of technical workers as a "new middle class" whose interests are implicitly aligned with
those of management and capital (poulantzas 1978). Others claim that technical workers are a
"new working class" because they engage in productive and manual labor (Mallet 1975; Gorz
1976). More empirically oriented Marxists have generally concluded that technicians are a bit of
both and, hence, should be considered "intennediate workers," a tenn which also lacks meaning
except when cast against a vertical background (Smith 1987; Wright 1979).
Weberian sociologists, labor economists and managerialists have also grappled with technical
work's marginality (Roberts, Loveridge, and Gennard 1972; Drucker 1979; Hendry 1990; Orr 1991).
However, instead of using the class structure as their yardstick, such analysts employ either an
organizational hierarchy or a vertical rendition of the occupational structure as a backdrop. Most
have concluded that technical workers are difficult to classify and control because their work
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possesses attributes of both administration and craft (Zussman 1985, Whalley 1986). Accordingly,
teclmical workers are usually assigned to an intermediate position in the organizational or
occupational hierarchy.
The difficulty with such conclusions is not that they are unreasonable, but that they deal
with only part of the picture. Vertical and horizontal divisions of labor have never been mutually
exclusive: in many firms both forms of organizing have long existed side by side. However,
outside professional bureaucracies, work has been dominated by employees whose skills easily fit a
hierarchial order. Consequently, the horizontal division of labor in such firms was relegated to
secondary status. With the teclmization of the labor force, scholars and managers can no longer
simply assume that the vertical will continue to overshadow the horizontal.
Figure 3 cross-classifies occupational groups by concepts pivotal to vertical or horizontal
divisions of labor. The vertical dimension is captured by whether an occupational group has a
authority to command and control. The horizontal dimension is signified by the degree to which
the group's skills and knowledge generalize across work sites. Managers and professionals inhabit
the upper echelons of a vertical division of labor because both usually have the authority to
command. However, a manager's substantive knowledge is usually more contextually bound than a
professional's. Oericals, operatives and craftspersons inhabit the lower rungs of the vertical
division of labor because they have little or no authority to command. However, like professionals,
the substantive knowledge of a craftsperson is more context-free than that of a clerk or operative.
Consequently, occupational groups on the left side of the table are defined primarily by the vertical
division of labor while those on the right also strongly participate in a horizontal division of labor.
As organizationally embedded professions expand and proliferate, the balance of a firm's
labor force clearly shifts toward the upper right of Figure 3 thereby magnifying the importance of
the horizontal division of labor. The implications of a broader technization of the workforce are
less clear. As the overlay labelled "teclmicians" in Figure 3 suggests, some new occupations that
carry the teclmician's moniker resemble traditional clerical occupations. For instance, the work of
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"scarming technicians" who create digital facsimiles of printed materials (Baynes, 1991) is akin to
the work of a copy machine operator. Other technical occupations, such as electrical engineering
and systems analysis, for all practical purposes have obtained the stature of professions. These
occupations have fonnal training programs, professional associations, professional journals and
various fonns of credentialling. However, the occupations that epitomize the technization of the
workforce (e.g. science technicians, engineering technicians, radiological technologists, emergency
medical technicians, technical writer, computer programmers, etc) have a more ambiguous status.
While they clearly enlarge the horizontal division of labor, they blur the attributes of craft and
profession.
New Crafts
Table 3 illustrates this blurring by situating technicians' work with respect to attributes that
sociologists usually ascribe to crafts and professions. Technicians resemble professionals in that
their work is sufficiently esoteric that few outsiders can claim to possess the skills or knowledge
that anchor the occupation. Moreover, their work is relatively analytic and often requires
specialized education. Many, but not all, of the major technical occupations have even developed
occupational societies and journals. However, in other ways, technical occupations more closely
resemble crafts. Apprenticeships and on-the-job training playa crucial role in the education of
technicians just as they do in the training of crafispersons. In fact, a significant minority of
engineers and technicians are trained solely by apprenticeship (Zussman 1985; Whalley 1986; Smith .
1987). Moreover, like crafispersons, many technicians operate equipment, create material artifacts,
and possess valued manual skills. Outside health care, certification and other fonns of control over
entry are rare. Finally, like crafispersons, technicians are more likely to unionize than are
professionals. The tendency for technicians to unionize is especially strong in Europe.
Although few in number, ethnographies of technical occupations suppon the notion that
technical work resembles a craft. Crafispersons have long been valued for their "anisanal"
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knowledge: the ability to render a skilled perfonnance based on an intuitive feel for materials and
techniques (Harper 1987). Artisanal skills are acquired primarily through practice and are difficult
to verbalize, much less codify. They reside in the practitioner's ability to read subtle visual, aural,
and tactile cues where novices would see no infonnation at all. Accordingly, craft knowledge is
spread infonnally through a community of practice by guided learning-by-doing and by exemplars
embedded in stories about previously accomplished work (Orr 1990).
Studies of engineers consistently report that engineers consider their fonnal analytic training
to be far less relevant than the practical knowledge of materials and machines acquired while on
the job (Bailyn 1980; Zussman 1985). Artisanal knowledge may be even more prominent among
technicians (Barley 1988a 1988b; Orr 1990; Jordan and Lynch 1989). Cambrosio and Keating
(1988) and Bechky (1991) concluded that although technicians in monoclonal antibody labs possess
considerable scientific training, they are often unable to fully articulate their techniques for
producing viable hybridomas. Consequently, biotechnologists frequently can not duplicate each
other's worlceven when procedures have been meticulously documented in scientific papers and
protocols. Thus, the transfer of technical knowledge often requires that a lab dispatch its
technicians and, even then, the recipient may be unable to cultivate the cell line successfully.
Orr (1991) discovered that technicians who repair Xerox machines also largely depend on an
oral culture of artisanship. Orr reports that service technicians frequently find the company's
technical documentation to be inadequate for diagnosing and repairing broken copiers. Although
perplexed technicians used the documentation as a resource, they relied more heavily on stories of
past encounters with broken machines. The stories served as exemplars rich with contextual details
and other diagnostic cues. The documentation was not deemed inadequate because the machine's
designers had omitted necessary information. Instead, the crucial information was unknown to the
designers because it could not be discovered until the copier was in use and in need of repair.
Thus, existing evidence suggests that the technization of worlcmay not only enhance the
importance of a horizontal division of labor, it seems to engender a new breed of occupations.
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Members of such occupations may require considerable formal knowledge of science, math, and
technology, yet their most valued skills appear to be those developed in a hands on conversation
with materials and techniques. Scientists, engineers and other professionals almost always possess
greater formal knowledge than the technicians who work under their supervision. However,
professionals rarely possess the artisanal skills that enable technicians to conduct a flawless
experiment, perform an adequate test, or operate a complex instrument without mishap. It is this
artisanal knowledge which makes technical workers indispensable to their employers and at the
same time provides them with power and autonomy (Barley 1990). Technicians' artisanal skills
may serve as grounds for the formation of fledgling occupational communities within, if not across,
firms (Van Maanen and Barley 1984).
The majority of technical occupations might therefore be usefully conceptualized as "new
crafts". Although such occupations usually lack the guild-like structure of a traditional craft, their
relation to management and other occupational groups seems quite similar. Like machinists,
carpenters and electricians, technicians command the mysteries of techniques and materials that lie
at the core of an enterprise's system of production. Whereas the older crafts were masters of wood
and metal, the materials of industrial society, the new crafts control the mysteries of scientific
procedures, software, and data -- the materials of post-industrial society. As such occupations
proliferate alongside an expanding professional workforce, firms are likely to become increasingly
occupationalized (Barley and Tolbert, 1991). Traditional organizational practices based solely on a
vertical conception of the division of labor may therefore become increasingly suspect, if not
ineffective.
The Mandate for Studying Technical Work
The expansion of the technical and professional workforce implies that coordination based
solely on the authority of position will grow more tenuous for several reasons. First, unless
managers are themselves technically trained, the claim that their expertise encompasses that of their
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subordinates will ring hollow to members of the technical labor force thereby undercutting
management's legitimacy. Second, to the degree that technical issues are central to a finn's
operation and strategy, managers may find that they need to involve technical workers in decision
making precisely because they lack the necessary expertise. Third, to the extent that core tasks
require the expertise of various technical specialists, team structures and collaborative systems are
likely to become more crucial for daily operation. Finally, to the degree that technical workers
possess esoteric but critical knowledge and skills, finns may need to adopt a new vision of the
employment relationship if they are to retain not only their employees but infonnation crucial to the
finn's continued operation. In short, by embedding expertise in individuals rather than positions,
rules and procedures, occupationalization will require finns to mesh vertical and horizontal work
cultures that have for so long been treated as incommensurate.
At present we know very little about either the technical workforce or how it is articulated
within vertically structured organizations. Even studies of the work of engineers have been rare.
Although research on the attitudes of engineers' flourished during the late 1960s (peltz and
Andrews 1966; Perrucci and Gertzl 1969; Ritti 1971), social scientists have only recently undertaken
contextualized studies of engineering practice (Zussman 1985; Whalley 1986). Far less is known
about technicians and other technical workers. Although there have been a few studies of
emergency medical technicians, radiological technologists, and other health care workers (see Metz
1981; Barley 1990), studies of technical work outside heath care settings comprise an nearly empty
set. Therefore, to understand the organizational implications of the technization of the workforce,
will gathering significant amounts of data on technicians and their relations with employers and
members of other occupational groups.
Accordingly, researchers associated with the Program on Technology and Work at Cornell's
School of Industrial and Labor Relations have undertaken, with fmancial support from the Center
for the Education of the Workforce,
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a five year program of research on the technical labor force. The research pivots on collecting
detailed ethnographic data on a variety of technical occupations spanning various work settings and
organizations. Through coordinated fieldwork, the researchers aim to build systematically a
comparative database to facilitate the development of a grounded theory of technical work.
As Figure 4 indicates, the research program is structured as a matrix fonned by studies of
specific occupations linked by cross-site comparative analyses. The design dictates that each
ethnographer undenalce prolonged field study of one or more technical occupations. Occupations
have been selected to represent the different paths by which technical work arises as well as the
various contexts in which technical workers are employed. Because the ethnographies seek to
depict technical practice from the perspective of an insider, each requires from 6 to 12 months of
fieldwork. Although the studies are intentionally tailored to the contours of the occupations under
investigation, each ethnographer also pursues a number of common foci to facilitate comparative
analyses. Common foci include: (1) the occupation's fonnal and infonnal structure, (2) the way in
which technical workers understand themselves and their work, (3) the skills, abilities, and attitudes
of the occupation's members, (4) the way in which members are trained and socialized, (5) career
paths available to those in the occupation, and (6) relations between members of the occupation and
members of other occupational groups including management. As the vertical arrows of the matrix
indicate, each study is intended to yield papers and monographs that depict key features of the
occupation's culture, structure, and practice.
In addition to pursuing separate studies, researchers participate in weekly team meetings.
The team meetings provide a forum for surfacing and then analyzing commonalities and differences
among the occupations under investigation. Comparative analyses facilitate the synthesis of data
from the various studies into a more general, but grounded, theory of technical work. The
integrative analyses are structured to yield co-authored papers and monographs on issues that cut
across occupations and organizational settings. As the horizontal axis in Figure 4 indicates initial
topics for integrative analysis include: (1) development of a definition of technical work and the
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technical labor force, (2) the role of training and skill in technical occupations, (3) the management
of uncertainty in technical operations, (4) the social construction of "professional" identities, and
(5) the role of instruments, equipment, machines, and scientific knowledge in the daily round of
technical work
The research program has been designed to unfold in a series of phases linked to the
different organizational contexts in which technical workers are employed and different levels of
generality. Each phase will encompass a wave of studies. During the first 18 months of the
project (November 1990 to May 1992), researchers will focus on technical workers in university
and health care settings. The initial wave of ethnographies, currently underway, includes studies of
science technicians in university laboratories, emergency medical technicians, medical technologists
in pathology labs at community hospitals, and technicians in a university library. Several of the
occupations are rooted in the "hiving off' of professional routines (medical technologists, science
technicians in general), others have been created by the advent of new technologies (technicians in
libraries, monoclonal antibody technicians) and yet another has evolved from amateur work
(EMT's).
The second wave of ethnographies, scheduled to begin in the Spring of 1992, will focus on
technical workers in industrial and other for-profit contexts. Occupations to be examined may
include: microcomputer specialists, engineers and engineering technicians in R&D labs, air traffic
controllers, broadcast technicians, programmers, and machinists. During the second phase,
ethnographies of factories which have adopted computer integrated manufacturing systems will also
be launched in an attempt to delineate advanced technologies may be altering the skills and social
organization of work not traditionally construed as technical. During the last phase of the project
(beginning in the Fall of 1993), randomly selected members of technical occupations in a variety of
work contexts will be surveyed. The survey research will be designed to illuminate theoretical
issues that have surfaced over the course of the study as well as to collect general data on the
attitudes, skills, training, and careers of technical workers.
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Table 1
Occupational Categories as a Percentage or the Labor Force: 1900-1988
Net
Category 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1988 Change
Pannworkers 38% 31% 27% 21% 17% 12% 6% 3% 3% 3% - 36%
OperativeslLaborers 25 27 27 27 28 26 24 23 18 16 9
Craft and Kindred 11 12 13 13 12 14 14 14 12 12 1
Service 9 10 8 10 12 11 12 13 13 13 4
Managerial 6 7 7 7 7 9 8 8 10 12 6
Sales Workers 5 5 5 6 7 7 7 7 11 12 7
Clerical and Kindred 3 5 8 9 10 12 15 18 17 16 13
ProfessionaJ/Technical 4 5 5 7 8 8 10 14 15 16 12
Note: Percentage employment by occupational category from 1900 to 1970 was calculated from employment data presented
on page 139 of The Statistical History of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present (U.S. Bureau of the Census
1976). Data for 1980 were taken from Klien's (1984) article which transfonns 1980 data using the Census Bureau's category
system developed in 1983. Data for 1988 are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. Bureau of
Commerce, 1990).
1988 Data Estimates for Year 2000
Employment Percent of Projected Employment Percent of
Category in Thousands Labor Force Growth Rate in Thousands Labor Force
Farm Workers 3,058 3%
- 4.8% 2,911 2%
Operatives and Laborers 17,814 16 1.3 18,046 14
Craft and Kindred 13,664 12 9.9 15,016 11
Service 15,332 13 22.6 18,797 14
Managerial 14,216 12 22.0 17,344 13
Sales Workers 13,747 12 19.6 16,441 12
Clerical and Kindred 18,642 16 11.8 20,842 16
Professionalffechnical 18,495 16 25.6 23,230 18
Total 114,968 100% 15.3 132,627 100%
Table 2
Projected Growth in Occupational Categories: 1988-2000
Note: Employment Data for 1988 were culled from U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990
Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office. Projected Growth rates for 1988-2000 are those used by Silvestri and Lukasiewicz
(1989).
Attribute
Skills and knowledge are
possessed by people outside
occupation.
Importance of fonnal education
as a means of training and
socialization.
Importance of on-the-job training
as a means of training and
socialization.
Balance of mental/analytic versus
manuaVsensate work.










Characteristics of Professions, Crafts, and Technical Occupations
Professions
Knowledge and skills are esoteric
and well guarded. Few outside the
occupation have more than a trivial
understanding of the content of
the occupation's knowledge base.
Most require either specialized
undergraduate or graduate training.
All require a college degree.
Crafts
Basic skills and knowledge are
widely held by persons outside the
occupation. However, finesse
is less widely distributed.
Technical Occupations
Knowledge and skills are esoteric.
In some instances, amateurs may exist
but, in general, they are relatively
rare.
May require a formal apprenticeship. Most require either a bachelors degree
Otherwise, formal education is or a specialized associate's degree or its
irrelevant equivalent.
Although informally important, clearly The primary avenue by which
of secondary relevance neophytes enter the occupation.
Tasks are heavily weighted toward
mental and analytic work.
Professional societies, licensing,
accreditation boards, professional





Tasks are heavily weighted toward
manual and sensate skills.






control of apprenticeship programs
High
High
Frequently reported as a critical form of
training. In some technical occupations, it
is the primary form of training.
Tasks involve a heavy mental and analytic
component, but the work also often has a
significant manual or sensate component.
Mixed picture. Some technical occupations
have journals and professional
societies. Others have none.
Common among technical occupations in
medicine. Otherwise rare.
Low with the exception of technical occupation
in medicine.
High
Less common than among crafts, more common
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